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IV 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : 
v. : Case No. 20020528-CA 
RODOLFO SOTOLONGO, : 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from a sentence entered on a guilty plea to aggravated assault, a 
third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-103(l)(b) (1999), in the Third 
Judicial District Court, Salt Lake County, Utah, the Honorable Robin W. Reese presiding. 
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(d) (1996). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUE PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
AND STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
Issue: Where a proportionality review of a co-defendant's sentence is not required, 
did the trial court act within its discretion in sentencing defendant to the statutory prison 
term? 
Standard of Review: Sentencing decisions are reviewed for abuse of discretion. 
See State v. Bluff, 2002 UT 66, J 66, 52 P.3d 1210. 
1 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
The following statutes are found in Addendum. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-104(3) (1999); 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-103(l)(b) (1999); 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-203(2)(c) (Supp. 2002). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant was charged by information with aggravated burglary, a first degree 
felony, and attempted criminal homicide and aggravated assault, both second degree 
felonies. R. 2-4,25-27- Upon entering a plea agreement, defendant pled guilty to 
aggravated assault, a third degree felony. R. 37-44. The court accepted the guilty plea 
and ordered AP&P to complete a presentence investigation report R.71. A diagnostic 
evaluation was also ordered R. 50-53. After reviewing those reports, the court sentenced 
defendant to the statutory indeterminate term of zero to five years in the Utah State 
Prison. R. 55-56. Defendant timely appealed his sentence. R. 57-58. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS1 
On June 6,2001, defendant and his cousin, Osmani Fuentes, went to Rosa 
Gamarro's residence to pick up some personal items that Fuentes had left there. R. 71:2. 
Fuentes and Gamarro had a common-law relationship during which they had a child 
together. Id. The relationship had ended during the prior month. Id. 
'Where the preliminary hearing transcript was not included in the record and no 
tnal was held below, the facts are recited from the Presentence Investigation Report, the 
Psychological Evaluation, the Diagnostic Evaluation, and the Diagnostic Group Report. 
See R.71. 
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When the men arrived at Garmarro's home, they were met at the door by Andrea 
Gamarro, Gamarro's eighteen-year-old daughter from a previous relationship. Id. 
Gamarro was not at home. R. 71:2-3. Both men were wearing surgical gloves. R. 71:2. 
Andrea feared Fuentes because he was enraged about the time she had recently called the 
police on him. Id. Andrea knew that Fuentes blamed her for ending his relationship with 
her mother and was angry at her for recently renewing her relationship with her birth 
father, having invited him rather than Fuentes to her graduation. Id. Both men entered 
the house and began gathering Fuentes' belongings. Id.1 
A short time later, the men confronted Andrea in a bedroom. Id. Fuentes grabbed 
Andrea, pushed her down on the bed, and declared that he was going to kill her. Id. 
Andrea fought back, biting Fuentes' fingers and kicking him. Id. Fuentes struck her 
several times on the head and face, and called for defendant to assist him. Id. Defendant 
handed Fuentes a belt and grabbed Andrea's legs, preventing her from kicking or moving. 
Id. While defendant held Andrea down, Fuentes put the belt around her neck, then he bit 
her under the left ear and exclaimed, "This is what you get for calling the police on me." 
Id. Fuentes pulled the belt tight, choking Andrea until she lost consciousness. Id. 
Andrea was lying beside the bed when she regained consciousness. Id. Upon 
seeing her stir, Fuentes exclaimed, "Oh, you are still alive." He then punched her and 
forced her onto the bed again, strangling her to unconsciousness with the belt. R. 71:2-3. 
2There is evidence that defendant and Fuentes forced their way into Andrea's 
residence. SeeR. 71:2. 
3 
When Andrea regained consciousness a second time, she overheard defendant telling 
Fuentes that he had better stop. R. 71:2. However, defendant did nothing to stop 
Fuentes. SeeR. 71:2-3. 
Instead, defendant watched as Andrea desperately reached for the telephone and 
Fuentes grabbed it away from her and continued to beat her. R. 71:3. While exchanging 
punches, Fuentes put his hands over Andrea's mouth and she bit him. Id. In response, 
Fuentes bit Andrea on her left cheek- Id. Andrea kicked Fuentes in the groin area, at 
which point he backed off and threatened her, telling her not to call anyone about the 
incident. Id. Fuentes told her that he knew where she lived and where her boyfriend 
lived and he had people willing to do things for him. Id. About that time, Rosa called 
Andrea. Id. Both defendant and Fuentes warned Andrea not to say anything about the 
incident and threatened to kill her. Id. 
Fuentes left the room and quickly returned with a knife from the kitchen. Id. 
Holding the knife as if he was going to stab Andrea, Fuentes exclaimed that he would 
come back and kill her if she called the police. Id. Fuentes further threatened that if he 
went to jail, he would have his friends or family members come and kill Andrea and her 
mother, father, and boyfriend. Id. Defendant joined in, threatening Andrea that she better 
not say anything about him because he had not done anything except hold her legs and he 
would have her killed if she involved him in any way. Id. 
Apparently, Fuentes left the apartment and defendant stayed in the room. Id. 
Defendant told Andrea to go clean up and again warned her not to say anything to 
4 
anyone. Id. He also threatened her that he would not go to jail, and that he would finish 
the job if she sent Fuentes to jail. R. 48-49; 71:3. Defendant then left the apartment. R. 
71:3.3 
After they left, Andrea telephoned her mother back, who in turn alerted the police. 
Id. Andrea was transported to the hospital where she was treated for multiple injuries to 
her face, chest, neck, ears, and abdomen. R. 21-24; 71:3. Most notably, she suffered 
severe swelling around her eyes and face, consistent with strangulation. R. 21-24. After 
examining her, the doctor opined that Andrea was "exceedingly lucky that she was not 
killed in this episode." Id. 
Andrea also suffered sever psychological and emotional damage as a result of the 
attack. R. 48. In a letter to the court, Andrea explained that the attack caused "deep 
depression" which required medication. Id. She further indicated that her self-esteem 
was decimated. R. 48; 71:6. For two weeks after the attack, Andrea was unable to leave 
her house because she felt so ugly that she could not bear to show her face in public. R. 
3About an hour after the attack, defendant was arrested at his work. R. 71:5. The 
story he gave police at that time differs significantly from Andrea's version of the event. 
See R. 71:3-4. In particular, defendant claimed that Fuentes ordered him to get the belt 
and hold Andrea's legs, and he complied out of his fear for Fuentes. See id. However, 
defendant's later versions of the event differed from his original report. See R. 71:15 
(defendant denied any wrongdoing and indicated that he took the plea on his attorney's 
advice). Irrespective of the inconsistencies in defendant's stories, he also could not offer 
reasonable explanations for his actions. See R. 71:Diagnostic Evaluation at 3-4 
(defendant was unable to provide a logical reason for wearing surgical gloves before 
entering Andrea's home, stating only that "[Fuentes] told [him] to put them on."). In any 
event, by pleading guilty to aggravated assault defendant has waived any challenge to the 
official version of the facts as recited by the victim. 
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48. Each time she looked in the mirror, the ugly scar on her lip reminded her that 
defendant and Fuentes hated her enough to try to kill her. Id. Moreover, Andrea now 
lives in fear, afraid to go anywhere alone fearing that she will be attacked again. R. 48; 
71:6. Her anxiety has also affected her job, making it impossible for her to work alone. 
R. 71:6. So far, therapy has been unsuccessful. Id. 
Additionally, the attack caused Andrea's family to be torn apart. Id. Relationships 
with her loved ones were permanently severed. Id. Andrea and her mother were forced 
to move from their apartment into a friend's garage with no heat or air conditioning. Id. 
They live in fear that Andrea will be attacked again. Id. 
At sentencing, when given the opportunity to address the court, defendant 
expressed no remorse for his actions. See R. 69:6,9. Instead, he repeatedly claimed that 
he "[has] the right... [and] descrve[s] a second chance to get his life together[.]" Id. 
Further, defendant claimed that he was Andrea's "hero" and that his actions actually 
saved her life. R. 69:1 -6; 71:1 -4. 
ARGUMENT SUMMARY 
Defendant claims that the trial court abused its discretion by not considering his 
allegedly more culpable co-defendant's probationary sentence in sentencing defendant to 
an indeterminate zero-to-five-year statutory prison term. That claim fails, however, 
because under Utah law a sentencing court is not required to perform a proportionality 
review. Indeed, so long as a defendant's sentence is based upon his or her individual 
participation in the offense, there can be no abuse of discretion. 
6 
Notwithstanding the fact that the trial court was not required to perform a 
proportionality review, the trial court considered extensive argument on that subject 
during the sentencing hearing. Ultimately, the court ruled that defendant's aggravating 
factors warranted the statutory prison term. Thus, defendant received the consideration 
he seeks on appeal. 
In any event, defendant's sentence was fair in light of the various aggravating 
factors, including defendant's unwillingness to take responsibility for his criminal 
behavior. The Presentence Investigation Report, the Psychological Evaluation, the 
Diagnostic Evaluation, and the Diagnostic Group Report, all of which were considered by 
the trial court, indicate that defendant's prison sentence was reasonable. Those 
documents reveal defendant's history of violent behavior toward women, his 
unwillingness to take responsibility for his criminal behavior, the gravity of his present 
offense, and the ineffectiveness of treatment programs. Accordingly, it cannot be said 
that no reasonable person would have taken the view adopted by the trial court in 
sentencing defendant to the statutory prison term. 
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ARGUMENT 
DURING SENTENCING, THE TRIAL COURT WAS NOT 
REQUIRED TO PERFORM A PROPORTIONALITY REVIEW OF 
THE CO-DEFENDANT'S SENTENCE; IN ANY EVENT, AFTER 
CONSIDERING ALL THE RELEVANT FACTORS, INCLUDING 
DEFENDANT'S UNWILLINGNESS TO ACCEPT 
RESPONSIBILITY FOR HIS ACTIONS, THE TRIAL COURT 
ACTED WITHIN ITS DISCRETION IN SENTENCING 
DEFENDANT TO PRISON 
At sentencing, defendant was sentenced to the indeterminate statutory prison term 
of zero-to-five-years for aggravated assault, a third degree felony. See Utah Code Ann. § 
76-5-103(l)(b) (1999); Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-203(2)(c) (Supp. 2002). Claiming that his 
actions "likely saved Andrea's life/* on appeal defendant argues that the trial court abused 
its discretion by awarding him a sentence that was disproportionate to the sentence 
offered to his co-defendant, Fuentes. Br. of Aplt. at 14-20. During defendant's 
sentencing hearing, defense counsel indicated that in sentencing Fuentes, Judge Barrett 
suspended Fuentes' one-to-fifteen-year prison sentence in favor of a one-year jail term 
and probation. R. 69:3. Based on that unilateral declaration, defendant claims that the 
trial court abused its discretion by not considering his lesser culpability together with the 
sentence Fuentes received. Br. of Aplt. at 14. Overall, defendant maintains that his 
sentence is inherently unfair and suggests that he should have been sentenced to 
probation. See id. Defendant's claims lack merit. 
"'[An appellate court] will reverse a trial court's sentencing decision only if it is an 
abuse of the judge's discretion.'" State v. Bluff, 2002 UT 66, f 66, 52 P.3d 1210 (citations 
8 
omitted). 'The trial court abuses its discretion when it fails to consider all legally 
relevant factors, or if the sentence imposed exceeds the limits prescribed by law." Id. 
'"Indeed,... sentencing reflects the personal judgment of the court, and consequently, a 
sentence imposed by the trial court should be overturned only when it is inherently unfair 
or clearly excessive/" Id. (citations omitted). 
A. The proportionality of a co-defendant's sentence is not a legally relevant 
sentencing factor under Utah law. 
Defendant does not claim that his sentence fell outside the legally prescribed 
limits. See Br. of Aplt at 14-20. Rather, he argues that the trial court abused its 
discretion by not considering his co-defendant's sentence of probation as a mitigating 
factor when sentencing defendant. See id. Under Utah law, however, the proportionality 
of a co-defendant's sentence is not a legally relevant sentencing factor, and therefore, 
need not be considered by a sentencing court. 
On appeal, defendant cites no Utah authority, and the State is aware of none, 
which requires a judge to consider the proportionality of a co-defendant's sentence during 
sentencing. See Br. of Aplt. at 14-15.4 To the contrary, in 1972, the Utah Supreme Court 
4In support of his position, defendant cites several cases out of Kansas which held 
that a sentencing court's failure to consider the proportionality of a co-defendant's 
sentence is reversible error. See Br. of Aplt. at 16-17. Besides the fact that those cases 
run contrary to Utah law, see State v. Kish, 503 P.2d 1208, 1209 (Utah 1972), they 
represent a minority position. See Cuzic v. State, 421 P.2d 537, 538 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1967) 
("The appellant could not complain . . . if identical sentences were not imposed on both 
[him and his co-defendant); State v. McFarland, 941 P.2d 330, 336 (Idaho Ct. App. 1997) 
(refusing to consider claim that the defendant's prison sentence was unfairly out of 
proportion to sentence received by his co-defendant); Carter v. State, 560 N.E.2d 687, 
9 
announced "[t]he law is correctly stated . . . [that] the appellant [cannot] complain . . . if 
identical sentences [are] not imposed on both [co-defendants]." State v. Kish, 503 P.2d 
1208, 1209 (Utah 1972). Since that time, Utah courts have consistently refused to 
consider the proportionality of sentences between co-defendants. See State v. Lafferty, 
2001 UT 19,1122,20 P.3d 342 (rejecting defendant's argument that his sentence is 
disproportionate to his co-defendant's sentence and holding that "case-by-case 
proportionality review is not required under the United States or Utah Constitution."); 
State v. Archuleta, 850 P.2d 1232,1249 (Utah), cert, denied, 510 U.S. 979 (1993) (same); 
State v. Tillman, 750 P.2d 546,561-62 (Utah 1987), cert, denied, 510 U.S. 1050 (1994) 
(same); State v. Gardner, 789 P.2d 273,287 (Utah 1989), cert, denied, 494 U.S. 1090 
(1990) (a court's focus should remain on the individual defendant and his or her acts "not 
comparison with other criminals and their crimes."). Cf. State v. Holland, 111 P.2d 1019, 
1025-26 (Utah 1989). 
Furthermore, under the general guidelines provided by the legislature, sentencing 
courts are only required to "[p]rescribe penalties which are proportionate to the 
690 (Ind. Ct. App. 1990) (finding no abuse of discretion in trial court's failure to 
articulate the co-defendant's lesser sentence as a mitigating factor); State v. Francois, 
817 So.2d 213,216 (La. Ct App. 2002) ("There is no requirement that co-defendants be 
treated equally by the sentencing judge."); State v. Weir, 600 A.2d 1105, 1106 (Me. 1991) 
(refusing to consider whether the defendant's sentence was excessive in relation to the 
prison sentences of his co-defendants); State v. White, 316 S.E.2d 112,115 (N.C. Ct. 
App. 1984) (irrespective of the more culpable co-defendant's lesser sentence, the trial 
court did not abuse its discretion where it sentenced the defendant to statutory maximum 
sentence); State v. Flores, 637 A.2d 366, 366-67 (R.I. 1994) ("confederates in crime need 
not receive equal sentences[.]"). 
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seriousness of offenses and which permit recognition or differences in rehabilitation 
possibilities among individual offenders." Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-104(3) (1999). In 
other words, sentencing decisions are to be based solely on the individual and his or her 
involvement in the crime. See id. 
In sum, where the proportionality of sentences between co-defendant's is not a 
legally relevant sentencing factor, a trial court cannot have abused its discretion by not 
affording it any weight. See Bluff, 2002 UT 66, f 66 ('The trial court abuses its 
discretion when it fails to consider all legally relevant factors[.]") (citations omitted). 
Thus, defendant's claim fails. 
B. Even though a proportionality review was not required under Utah law, the 
trial court considered Fuentes* sentence in sentencing defendant 
Although in sentencing defendant the trial court was clearly not required to 
consider the proportionality of Fuentes' sentence, it did so anyway. At sentencing, after 
having received and reviewed the Presentence Investigation Report (PSI), the Diagnostic 
Evaluation, the Psychological Evaluation, and the Diagnostic Group Report, trial court 
offered defense counsel an opportunity to speak. R. 69:l-4.5 During his argument, 
defense counsel urged the court to weigh the probationary sentence awarded to Fuentes 
against defendant's alleged lesser culpability as the most important reason for awarding 
defendant a similar sentence. R. 69:3. 
5Form 4 of the PSI notes defendant's lesser role in the crime as a mitigating factor. 
SeeR. 7i:Form4. 
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Now [defendant], as you know, has pled to a third degree felony. 
Mr. [Fuentes] pled to a second degree felony and was sentenced on June 
10th before Judge Barrett and at that time he was given a sentence of one to 
15 years in prison. That prison term was suspended and he was placed on 
probation and he was sentenced to do 365 days or a year in jail and he was 
given credit for the time served. And I'm not sure how much time he'd 
actually served but he was given a year in jail with credit for that time and 
was ordered to do a hundred hours community service. 
There are a lot of things I would like to say on [defendant's] behalf 
but I think that in itself is a big reason why the Court shouldn't follow the 
recommendation in this case because [defendant] who was clearly the less 
culpable and who, in fact, tried to stop Mr. [Fuentes] and was successful in 
stopping him from continuing the attack, I think it would be a terrible 
miscarriage of justice if he were to receive a prison sentence, an 
unsuspended prison sentence where Mr. [Fuentes], who is really the real 
culpable person in this case, not to say that [defendant] was not culpable as 
well, but Mr. [Fuentes] is the seriously culpable person in this case. It 
would be a miscarriage of justice if he gets probation and a year and 
[defendant] goes to prison. 
R. 69:3-4. Defense counsel reiterated that argument several times during the hearing. 
See R. 69:5,9. 
In response, the prosecutor correctly informed the trial court that it need not 
perform a proportionality review in sentencing defendant, and urged the court to 
individually examine the circumstances of defendant's crime. R. 69:6. Then the 
prosecutor further expounded on defendant's involvement and the terrible nature of his 
crime. R 69:6-9. 
After hearing defendant's rebuttal, the judge stated, "I don't know why the co-
defendant received the sentence that he did but [defendant], it seems me that a fair 
12 
sentence for what you did would be the indeterminate term of zero to five years in the 
state prison and I'll impose that sentence today." R. 69:9-10. 
Although, as shown above, the trial court was not required to consider the co-
defendant's sentence in sentencing defendant, it did so anyway, listening to extensive 
argument on the subject from both defense counsel and the prosecutor. See R. 69. 
Ultimately, the trial court concluded that defendant's involvement in the crime, even 
though seemingly less than Fuentes' culpability, demanded the statutory prison sentence. 
See R. 69:9-10. Thus, given the trial court's consideration of Fuentes' sentence and 
culpability, defendant has no complaint. 
C. Overall, in light of defendant's unwillingness to accept responsibility for his 
actions and the various other aggravating factors, the trial court acted within 
its discretion in sentencing defendant to prison. 
Overall, defendant claims that his sentence is fundamentally unfair given his 
alleged lesser culpability. See Br. of Aplt. 16. However, given the trial court's 
consideration of defendant's failure to take responsibility for his actions, and the various 
other aggravating factors noted in the PSI, the Diagnostic Evaluation, the Psychological 
Evaluation, and the Diagnostic Group Report, the court acted within its discretion in 
sentencing defendant to an indeterminate zero-to-five-year statutory prison term. 
"[T]he sentencing judge[] [has] discretion in determining what punishment fits 
both the crime and the offender[.]" State v. Lipsky, 608 P.2d 1241, 1249 (Utah 1980). 
"'A sentence in a criminal case should be appropriate for the defendant in light of his 
background and the crime committed and also serve the interests of society which 
13 
underlie the criminal justice system."' Id. (citing State v. McClendon, 611 P.2d 728, 729 
(Utah 1980)). An appellate court accords the trial court considerable deference because 
trial judges are "in the best position to assess the credibility of the witnesses and to derive 
a sense of the proceedings as a whole, something an appellate court cannot hope to gamer 
from a cold record." State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932,936 (Utah 1994). As such, "the 
exercise of discretion in sentencing necessarily reflects the personal judgment of the 
court," which endeavors to impose "a proper sentence based on the facts and law before 
it" State v. Gerrard, 584 P.2d 885, 887 (Utah 1978). Accordingly, "[an appellate court] 
find[s] abuse only if it can be said that no reasonable [person] would take the view 
adopted by the trial courtf;]... [i]t must be clear that the actions of the judge were so 
inherently unfair as to constitute abuse of discretion." Id. 
Here, in formulating an appropriate sentence for defendant, the trial court 
considered defendant's PSI, Diagnostic Evaluation, Psychological Evaluation, and 
Diagnostic Group Report. See R. 71; State v. Schweitzer, 943 P.2d 649, 652 (Utah App 
1997) (affirming the defendant's sentence where the relevant factors were presented to 
the trial court through the defendant's testimony, his counsel's arguments, therapist's 
reports, and the PSI, and "defendant [did] not show trial court failed to consider these 
factors."). A review of defendant's background, criminal history, character, treatment 
needs, as well as the gravity of his crime as noted in those four documents reveals that the 
trial court acted within its discretion in sentencing defendant to the statutory prison term. 
See State v. Howell, 707 P.2d 115, 118 (Utah 1985) (although a sentencing judge will 
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give considerable weight to the circumstances of the crime, a judge may also consider 
other factors); State v. Nuttall, 861 P.2d 454, 458 (Utah Ct. App. 1993) ("the trial court 
did not abuse its discretion by placing more emphasis on punishing defendant rather than 
rehabilitating him"). 
Background and criminal history. Defendant's background and criminal history 
indicate that he is a moderately intelligent yet untruthful individual who has a history of 
violent behavior directed at women. See R. 71; Nuttall, 861 P.2d at 458 (in sentencing 
the trial court may consider several factors, including what is necessary "to protect 
society from an individual deemed to be a danger to the communityf.]"). 
In the PSI defendant reported coming from a loving and supportive family, and 
having experienced a normal childhood with his natural parents. See R. 71:10-11. 
However, several months later, during his psychological evaluation defendant revealed 
that his father was constantly abusive toward his mother and was imprisoned when 
defendant was very young. See R. 71:Psychological Evaluation at 1. As a result, 
defendant was raised by his paternal uncle. See id. Defendant indicated that while 
growing up he did not have many true friends because "they put you in problems." See 
id. The reports also indicated that defendant changed jobs five times within the last four 
years, having been fired twice for being arrested. See R. 71:12; Psychological Evaluation 
at 2. 
When interviewed, defendant was found to be in the extremely low to borderline 
range of intellectual ability. See R. 71 diagnostic Evaluation at 2. However, his low 
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score was attributed to his inability to fluently communicate in English. See R. 
71:Psychological Evaluation at 4. Moreover, defendant reported that he achieved A's and 
B's in school. See id. at 2. 
Although at the time of sentencing defendant's criminal history consisted of seven 
minor traffic offenses, during the same year as the instant offense defendant's wife filed 
domestic violence charges against him in connection with two separate incidents. See R. 
71:9-10. Only four months after the present offense, defendant was charged with 
domestic violence assault, a class B misdemeanor, and disturbing the peace, an infraction. 
See id. Then, one month later, defendant was charged with domestic violence battery, a 
class B misdemeanor, and disturbing the peace, an infraction. See id. 
Originally defendant told the AP&P investigator that he had never used or abused 
alcohol or drugs. R. 71:13, However, that statement proved to be untrue. Several 
months later, during his psychological evaluation, defendant admitted that he 
experimented with alcohol at the age of 17 and he now regularly drinks. R. 
71: Psychological Evaluation at 3. In fact, defendant claimed to have been drinking 
alcohol when he assaulted his wife. Id. 
Defendant's character. The PSI, the Diagnostic Evaluation, the Psychological 
Evaluation, and the Diagnostic Group Report all indicate that defendant has serious 
character flaws that would make probation ineffective. See R. 71. Indeed, each of those 
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reports express great concern that defendant exhibits a serious unwillingness to take 
responsibility for his actions. See id. 
In the PSI, after noting defendant's claim that he saved Andrea's life, his 
consistent denial of wrongdoing, and his claim that he acted out of fear for his cousin, the 
AP&P investigator indicates that it "has doubts as to [] defendant's claim of innocence." 
R. 71:15. The investigator notes that "if [] defendant were truly attempting to intervene 
and help [Andrea], he would have notified the authorities, and because he did not, this 
agency suspects [] defendant's participation in this matter was more than what he would 
have this agency and the court believe." Id. Further, the investigator found defendant's 
story of the event to be suspicious due to inconsistencies between defendant's present 
version of the event and the statements he initially gave to police. Id. Thus, the 
investigator determined that "it does not appear [that] defendant is accepting 
responsibility for his actions." Id. 
The investigator was also extremely troubled by the fact that defendant was twice 
arrested for domestic violence after committing the instant offense. Id. That pattern of 
behavior "suggestfs] [defendant] has recently developed a tendency toward violence." Id. 
Although the Criminal History Assessment placed defendant in a probation category, the 
investigator concluded that defendant's violent pattern of behavior coupled with the 
seriousness of defendant's offense, the physical and emotional injuries suffered by the 
victim, and defendant's denial of culpability warrant a prison sentence. R. 71:15-16. 
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The Diagnostic Evaluation also concluded that defendant "takes little 
responsibility for his actions." R. 71 .Diagnostic Evaluation at 2. During the evaluation, 
despite knowing that Fuentes was prohibited from contacting Andrea, having provided 
the belt used to perpetrate the crime, and having held Andrea's legs while she was beaten, 
defendant consistently denied any intention of harming Andrea, or any knowledge that 
Fuentes intended to harm her. Id. Furthermore, defendant repeatedly minimized the 
extent of the Andrea's injuries, continually maintaining that he "saved her life." Id. at 3. 
Based on those observations, the Diagnostic Evaluation recommended that defendant be 
sentenced to the statutory prison term. Id. at 5. 
While attending his diagnostic group, defendant was found to have a "Victim 
Stance" thinking error pattern—perceiving himself as a victim to justify victimizing 
others. R. 71 .Diagnostic Group Report at 1. Instead of being self-critical, defendant 
blames other people, situations, or things for his behavior. Id. For example, when talking 
about his domestic violence charges, defendant blamed his actions on his wife's behavior. 
Id. Moreover, defendant would constantly minimize his assaultive and aggressive 
behavior and talk as if his present offense was simply a big misunderstanding. Id. at 2. 
Defendant went so far as to claim that he was the victim of his wife, his cousin Fuentes, 
and the legal system. Id. As a result, the Diagnostic Group Report concluded that 
"[defendant] has demonstrated little willingness to benefit from treatment at this time[,]" 
and recommended that he should be sent to prison where he could receive treatment as 
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soon as he is willing to benefit from it. Id. at 3. This course of action would both serve 
defendant's needs and protect the community from further victimization. Id. 
The gravity of the crime. The extreme nature of defendant's crime also weighs in 
favor of a statutory prison sentence. Although he may have been less culpable than 
Fuentes, defendant's actions warranted the zero-to-five-year statutory prison term. 
When Fuentes initially suggested that they go to Andrea's home, defendant knew 
that Fuentes had been barred from contacting Andrea and her mother. See R. 
71: Diagnostic Evaluation at 2. In fact, defendant knew that it was his role to gain entry 
into Andrea's home, because she would not have opened her door for Fuentes. See id. at 
3. Defendant's act of wearing rubber gloves before entering Andrea's home is proof of 
his knowledge that he was about to commit a serious crime. See id. 
When Fuentes began attacking Andrea, instead of calling the police or simply 
assisting the Andrea, defendant watched as Fuentes beat her. See R. 71:2. Shortly 
thereafter defendant joined the attack, providing Fuentes with the belt used to strangle 
Andrea, and holding her legs down while she was battered and strangled. See id. R. 21 -
24. There was no indication that defendant and Fuentes only intended to cause Andrea to 
loose consciousness. See R. 71:2-3. Rather, it appears as though they meant to kill her 
and failed to do so. Indeed, it was only after Andrea had twice lost consciousness that 
defendant told Fuentes that he better stop. See R. 71:2. Even then, defendant did nothing 
to stop Fuentes, continuing to watch as Andrea was further assaulted. See R. 71:2-3. 
After that, defendant threatened Andrea not to tell anyone about his involvement. See R. 
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71:3. In particular, defendant threatened to kill her, stating that he would not go to jail 
and that he would finish the job if she sent Fuentes to jail. R. 48-49; 71:3. 
As a result of the attack, Andrea suffered multiple injuries to her face, chest, neck, 
ears, and abdomen. R. 21-24; 71:3. The attack was so serious that the examining doctor 
later opined that Andrea was "exceedingly lucky that she was not killed in this episode." 
Id. 
Defendant's actions also caused Andrea to suffer from severe psychological, 
emotional, and financial distress. SeeK. 48; 71:6. Andrea reported that the attack caused 
extreme depression requiring medication and ultimately rendering psychological 
counseling ineffective. See id. For two weeks after the attack, Andrea was unable to 
leave her house because she felt so ugly that she could not bear to show her face in 
public. See R. 48. The ugly scar on her lip constantly reminds her that defendant and 
Fuentes hated her enough to try to kill her. See id. Now, Andrea lives in fear, afraid to 
go anywhere alone fearing that she will be attacked again. See R. 48; 71:6. She has also 
had trouble holding a job because she cannot work alone. See R. 71:6. Furthermore, 
attempting to avoid future attacks, Andrea and her mother were forced to move into a 
friend's garage with no heat or air conditioning. See id. 
Effectiveness of treatment In general, the reports indicate that defendant's 
current attitude is not conducive to treatment at this time. See R. 71 :Diagnostic Group 
Report at 2-3. The Diagnostic Group Report indicated that although defendant's 
conversational skills were adequate, he appeared to be using a language barrier as an 
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excuse for not completing assignments. See id. at 2. Further, defendant did not 
demonstrate a willingness to understand the concepts of the group. See id. Nor was he 
able to identify his own thinking errors. See id. Because defendant did not demonstrate 
the ability to be self-critical he was not found to be a good candidate for treatment at this 
time. See id. For that reason, it was recommended that defendant be sentenced to prison 
where he could take advantage of treatment programs as soon as he is willing. See id.6 
Given the various aggravating factors including defendant's history of violent 
behavior toward women, his unwillingness to take responsibility for his criminal 
behavior, the gravity of his present offense, and the ineffectiveness of treatment 
programs, it cannot be said that no reasonable person would have taken the view adopted 
by the trial court. See Gerrard, 584 P.2d at 887, Nor is it clear that the actions of the 
trial court were inherently unfair. See id. Accordingly, after considering the mitigating 
and aggravating factors noted in the PSI, the Diagnostic Evaluation, the Psychological 
Evaluation, and the Diagnostic Group Report, the court acted within its discretion in 
sentencing defendant to an indeterminate zero-to-five-year statutory prison term. 
6In any event, no treatment programs were willing to accept defendant. Due to his 
failure to take responsibility for his actions and the seriousness of his crime, defendant 
was denied placement into programs at First Step House and Odyssey House. R. 
71 .Diagnostic Evaluation at 4. 
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CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing, the State respectfully requests the Court to affirm 
defendant's statutory prison sentence. 
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ADDENDUM 
UTAH CODE, 1953 
TITLE 76. UTAH CRIMIHAL CODE 
CHAPTER 1. GENERAL PROVISIONS 
PART 1. INTRODUCTORY PROVISIONS 
Copyright © 2002 by Matthew Bender & Company, Inc., a member of the 
LexisNexis Group. All rights reserved. 
Current through the 2002 5th Special Session 
76-1-104 Purposes and principles of construction. 
The provisions of this code shall be construed in accordance with these general 
purposes. 
(1) Forbid and prevent the commission of offenses. 
(2) Define adequately the conduct and mental state which constitute each 
offense and safeguard conduct that is without fault from condemnation as criminal. 
(3) Prescribe penalties which are proportionate to the seriousness of offenses 
and which permit recognition or differences in rehabilitation possibilities 
among individual offenders. 
(4) Prevent arbitrary or oppressive treatment of persons accused or convicted 
of offenses. 
UTAH CODE, 1953 
TITLE 76. UTAH CRIMINAL CODE 
CHAPTER 5. OFFENSES AGAINST THE PERSON 
PART 1. ASSAULT AND RELATED OFFENSES 
Copyright © 2002 by Matthew Bender & Company, Inc., a member of the 
LexisNexis Group. All rights reserved. 
Current through the 2002 5th Special Session 
7 6-5-103 Aggravated assault. 
(1) A person commits aggravated assault if he commits assault as defined in 
Section 76-5-102 and he: 
(a) intentionally causes serious bodily injury to another; or 
(b) under circumstances not amounting to a violation of Subsection (l)(a), 
uses a dangerous weapon as defined in Section 76-1-601 or other means or force 
likely to produce death or serious bodily injury. 
(2) A violation of Subsection (1)(a) is a second degree felony. 
(3) A violation of Subsection (1)(b) is a third degree felony. 
UTAH CODE, 1953 
TITLE 76. UTAH CRIMINAL CODE 
CHAPTER 3. PUNISHMENTS 
PART 2. SENTENCING 
Copyright © 2002 by Matthew Bender & Company, Inc., a member of the 
LexisNexis Group. All rights reserved. 
Current through the 2002 5th Special Session 
76-3-203 Felony conviction —Indeterminate term of imprisonment —Increase of 
sentence if dangerous weapon used. 
(1) As used in this section, "dangerous weapon" has the same definition as in 
Section 76-1-601. 
(2) A person who has been convicted of a felony may be sentenced to imprisonment 
for an indeterminate term as follows: 
(a) In the case of a felony of the first degree, for a term of not less than 
five years, unless otherwise specifically provided by law, and which may be for 
life, but if the trier of fact finds beyond a reasonable doubt that a dangerous 
weapon was used in the commission or furtherance of the felony, the court shall 
sentence the person convicted for a term of not less than six years, and which may 
be for life. 
(b) In the case of a felony of the second degree, for a term of not less than 
one year nor more than 15 years, but if the trier of fact finds beyond a 
reasonable doubt that a dangerous weapon was used in the commission or furtherance 
of the felony, the court shall sentence the person convicted for a term of not 
less than two years nor more than 15 years; and the court may sentence the person 
convicted for a term of not less than two years nor more than 20 years. 
(c) In the case of a felony of the third degree, for a term not to exceed five 
years, but if the trier of fact finds beyond a reasonable doubt that a dangerous 
weapon was used in the commission or furtherance of the felony, the court shall 
sentence the person convicted for a term of not less than one year nor more than 
five years; and the court may sentence the person convicted for a term of not less 
than one year nor more than ten years. 
(d) If the trier of fact finds beyond a reasonable doubt that any person who 
has been sentenced to a term of imprisonment for a felony in which a dangerous 
weapon was used in the commission of or furtherance of the felony and is 
subsequently convicted of another felony when a dangerous weapon was used in 
the commission of or furtherance of the felony shall, in addition to any other 
sentence imposed, be sentenced for an indeterminate term to be not less than five 
nor more than ten years to run consecutively and not concurrently. 
